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Abstract 
This paper argues that any discussion of the operationalization of 
Gross National Happiness (GNH) in Bhutan within an immediate or 
intermediate time-frame must account for the fact that operationalization 
implies the adoption of long-range policy objectives and immediate or 
intermediate policy decisions, made in real time, that aim at reaching those 
objectives.  The discussion of any operationalizaton of GNH, therefore, 
cannot fruitfully take place in abstracto, because that implies a lack of 
seriousness in raising the subject in the first place.  The paper seeks to 
outline, only briefly and suggestively, a framework within which discussion 
of the operationalization of GNH may take place, focusing on the question 
of Bhutan’s possible entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).  It 
concludes that a decision to operationalize GNH in Bhutan carries with it 
certain consequences that can be defined within the structure of the problem 
of choice, and that structure can best be considered as a quadrilemma.  The 
potential consequences of choice must be taken into account in choosing for 
any particular set of policy directions and the potential cost must be accepted 
as part of the solution of the problem the quadrilemma suggests.  
Bhutan’s Policy Objectives within the Framework of GNH 
We may assume that the word “development” best defines Bhutan’s 
long-range objective, but it is precisely the meaning of this term for Bhutan, 
and the policies and policy decisions needed to achieve that objective once it 
is defined, that the concept of GNH is intended to cover.  Therefore, we 
must try to indicate, if only in the most general terms, what the components 
of GNH-guided development may be.  We can assume, for the purpose of 
this argument, that they are five in number: 
Eradication of Poverty.  
Poverty in absolute terms suggests a level of income, in cash and/or 
kind, beneath which a reasonable standard of living, as defined by the 
values of a society, cannot be sustained.  Obviously, GNH not only needs to 
consider what constitutes “poverty” in Bhutan but also what phenomena it 
covers.  For example, it may ask who defines “poverty” in Bhutan and what 
institutions are engaged in the definition.  It may consider whether a 
concept of “spiritual poverty” or “cultural poverty” is part of the definition 
of the condition of poverty in Bhutan.  In brief, GNH certainly suggests the 
need to define the term in specifically Bhutanese terms.  Relative poverty 
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implies a spread of income that is too great to be sustained either by the 
values of the society or the institutions of the polity.  The eradication of 
poverty within the framework of GNH thought suggests, therefore, at least 
the possibility that the measures usually adopted to alleviate poverty as 
defined by strictly economic models may not be completely or even 
primarily applicable in Bhutan.  For example, some models of development 
(China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, for example), based 
development on state-enforced forced savings, primarily from the peasants, 
and the State’s police powers were used to prevent deviation from this 
policy.  In other societies, great disparity of income, often accompanied by 
equally great corruption, was maintained by the oppressive police power of 
the State (Indonesia under Suharto was an example).  Neither possibility is 
acceptable under GNH.  The operationalization of GNH, then, denies 
certain even temporary justifications for the continuation of poverty and 
requires the state to eradicate poverty by changing the conditions that give 
rise to it or allow it to continue.   
Preservation of National Sovereignty 
  National sovereignty may be defined as the ability of a national polity 
to determine for itself, by whatever means it chooses, the policies, 
institutions, and procedures whereby its population lives within its 
boundaries.  Obviously there are always limitations on sovereignty, 
including, for example, relative power internationally, geographical 
considerations (e.g., limits on the use of resources, such as rivers, that are 
shared across national boundaries), international political and economic 
obligations, etc.  While national sovereignty may not be measurable as an 
absolute quantity (except negatively, when one nation is completely 
incorporated into another), a nation’s ability to expand or diminish the 
reach or depth of its sovereignty is always a trade-off in terms of other 
factors or values that must be addressed in the formulation of policy. 
Maintenance and Development of Culture 
  While it is true that social scientists have never succeeded in defining 
“culture,” it remains something that everyone can perceive when he or she 
sees it.  Cultures are malleable, which in this instance means that they 
change, sometimes more rapidly, sometimes less rapidly, depending on 
decisions that are made by a nation through its institutions and on the 
historical circumstances within which a nation may find itself and which 
limit its ability to make independent decisions regarding its culture.  The 
degree to which the development of a culture may be influenced by political 
or economic decisions depends on the policy directions a nation takes in 
fields ranging from education to the economy.  While GNH envisages the 
use of culture to protect the integrity of the nation, it also posits the 
development of Bhutanese culture as an instrument for defense.  “National 
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identity,” therefore, beyond its definition on legal documents, is a 
significant variable both in the formulation and the consequences of policy 
decisions. 
Good Governance, Democratization and Decentralization 
  Good governance is one of the objectives of GNH, and, according to 
prevailing ideas, that objective is best served by decentralization and 
democratization.   Good governance assumes that the stakeholders in a 
society hold the policy- and decision-makers accountable, and this, in turn, 
assumes the ability of all the stakeholders to participate in the process of 
policy formation and to evaluate the decisions that are made in pursuit of 
those policies.  In general this means that an educated and informed 
population can exercise its judgment on the managers of society, through 
whatever mechanisms a given society establishes for that purpose.  It also 
assumes, however, the existence within that society of a shared set of values, 
norms, and standards on the basis of which the population can judge its 
managers.  GNH is about values, norms, and standards, but it is also about 
education for participation (as well as about making a living).   
Self-determination 
  Good governance and self-determination are closely linked concepts.  
Without good governance self-determination may be the exercise of the will 
of a small group that holds concentrated power in its hands, power that it 
exercises on behalf of the society but without accountability to the society as 
a whole. There is a dilemma here, of course:  The freedom of the state to act 
independently, and in the contemporary world to act quickly, sometimes 
requires, or seems to require, that it be able to act without direct reference to 
the society on behalf of which it is operating.  Accountability may be 
delayed until after, sometimes long after, action has been taken, by which 
time the introduction of other issues or forgetfulness diminishes the degree 
of accountability.  This is a dilemma of representative democracy in the 
contemporary world, for example.   
The operationalization of Gross National Happiness is an issue 
precisely because it is by no means clear that the commonly accepted 
definition of “development” satisfies the needs of poverty eradication, the 
maintenance or even the increase of national sovereignty, the maintenance 
and development of Bhutanese culture, good governance, and self-
determination.   
General and Specific Limitations on Freedom of Policy Choice 
Bhutan’s ability to make policy choices in the pursuit of Gross National 
Happiness maybe defined or even limited by both general system 
considerations and specific characteristics of the nation. 
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General Considerations 
  Although we like to think that we make decisions in a world in which 
our decisions are made in a mono-directional fashion, that is, decisions and 
consequences are identified by a close cause-effect relationship, we are 
increasingly aware of the problem of unintended effects, which is to say that 
a given policy decision may lead to a quite different consequence than the 
one we intended.  The fact of the matter is that we live in a highly complex 
and very integrated socioeconomic universe, which we divide into domains 
(“disciplines”) for the sake of analysis, but these domains disappear as 
distinct entities when we look more closely at the political economy.  Any 
decision we make in one area may have quite unintended consequences far 
from the domain in which the original decision was made.  The introduction 
of new technology may lead to social change that may result in increasing 
political dissatisfaction in a significant element of the population, or even in 
the production of a new social class, which, in turn, may result in 
revolutionary seizure of power.  New inventions and ways of doing 
business that, collectively, we call the “Industrial Revolution” were not 
intended to produce an urban middle class in France that would seize 
political power and create a new political system.   
Specific Considerations 
  Although the specificities of Bhutan’s situation are well known, it is 
important to rehearse them here in order to highlight the complexities of 
choice that face the society. 
1.  Bhutan is a small state.  Bhutan appears on almost every list (World 
Bank, IMF, Commonwealth Secretariat) of “small states,” a category 
sometimes defined as “states with populations of less than 1.5 million 
people.”  It is not possible here to discuss the characteristics that distinguish 
small states from all the others, but they suggest that small states are so 
different from the states on which the traditional models of economic 
development are based that they require a different analysis and different 
solutions to the problems presented by “development.”  They are highly 
vulnerable to external events, have small domestic markets, have very 
limited capacity in the public and private sectors, are relatively 
undiversified in their production and exports, etc.  These conditions limit 
Bhutan’s choices in the pursuit of development and require different 
solutions.  The operationalization of GNH, with its strong adoption of 
specific goals and values, further narrows the choice of “development 
strategies” by requiring and even insisting on profoundly humanizing both 
the definition and the process of development. 
2.  Bhutan is a “developing” society.  That Bhutan is a less-developed 
economy or society is not arguable.  If “development” means 
“improvement,” the question of the realization of development very much 
depends on the values to which the society accords importance.  That 
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Bhutan lacks the resources to “develop” in all sectors at the same time is a 
given, but then this is also the case with advanced industrial societies such 
as the United States.  From the point of view of resources, all resources are 
scarce and so choice must be made, no less in Bhutan than in North 
America.  The fact that Bhutan still has the ability to decide which path it 
wishes to pursue, which means to determine its own priorities (to the extent 
that it does indeed have that ability), suggests that in a way Bhutan can 
benefit at this stage in its history from its “underdeveloped” condition to 
expand its ability to exercise choice, albeit with certain limitations, to which 
we will come. 
3.  Bhutan has limited resources.  The nation’s capacity to grow exports 
or to speed-up domestic economic development is limited by its lack of 
resources, including “natural” resources, capital, labor, etc.  Whatever 
measures are taken to overcome this lack in one area will have 
consequences in other areas, as we will suggest. 
4.  Bhutan is a landlocked country.  Landlocked countries experience 
particular difficulties in gaining access to world markets, which is a 
limitation on their ability to use trade as a way to overcome the limitation of 
resources.  Moreover, Bhutan’s neighbors are only two in number, one of 
which is relatively unavailable to Bhutan as a resource for trade and 
development. 
5.  Bhutan is deeply integrated with the Indian economy.  To the extent 
that Bhutan seeks to deepen its integration with the global economy as an 
instrument for its own development (even given the conditions already 
mentioned), it is limited by the extent of its already existing integration with 
the Indian economy.  Considerations of relative political power and size of 
economies severely condition Bhutan’s ability to engage itself with the 
global market. 
Bhutan’s WTO Quadrilemma 
Operationalization of Gross National Happiness will require very 
difficult policy choices in the short- and intermediate term that will have 
long-term consequences.  The difficulty of these choices can be indicated by 
a discussion of the quadrilemma Bhutan faces in consideration of the value 
and significance of its joining the WTO. 
A quadrilemma may be defined as a state that requires a choice 
between four relatively equal or attractive options, any combination of two 
or three of which will prove unsatisfactory with regard to one or two of the 
others.  In other words, “you can’t have your cake and eat it too.”  The 
decision about whether to join the WTO poses a quadrilemma because there 
are four primary elements that must be taken into account but that may be, 
to some extent, mutually incompatible at some level.  These elements are:  
globalization (meaning, thereby, real and “deep” integration into the global 
market; the continuing development and continued existence of the nation-
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state, in this case Bhutan; the development of a decentralized and 
democratic polity; and the pursuit of Gross National Happiness as an 
objective and a guide to development choices. 
Globalization and the Nation-state 
  It is now a commonplace to point out that globalization as a process of 
economic integration on a global scale has a long history, extending at least 
as far back as the 18th century, let us say, and that that history is not 
unilinear, i.e., there have been periods of increasing and of decreasing 
global economic integration.   
In the last decade or so, “globalization” has often been presented, 
ahistorically, as a new phenomenon and, ideologically, as a phenomenon 
that is somehow “natural,” i.e., that is somehow propelled by the forces of 
nature so that either you join or you get left by the wayside.  Only lately, 
and partly as a result of intellectual critiques and analyses of “globalization” 
and of political and social protests against it, has globalization been 
considered as something less than a natural force.   
World Wars I and II demonstrated the consequences of a totally 
fragmented world in which individual states or nation-states were pursuing 
their own political and economic objectives without serious consideration 
being given to the broader welfare of the world community.  World War I 
led to the creation of institutions intended to control, or at least soften, the 
consequences of international competition and to economic theories and 
policies that would soften the consequences of a relatively unbridled 
market.  World War II was, to no small extent, the consequence of the failure 
of the institutions and policies that followed World War I.  Consequently, 
after World War II two sets of institutions were created that, it was hoped, 
would prevent the rise again of those conditions that had led to World War 
II.  Those institutions were The United Nations and its ancillary and 
associated bodies, and the Bretton Woods institutions, namely the World 
Bank, the IMF, and the GATT (replacing the failed ITO).   
Both sets of institutions were predicated on the need to mediate 
between the nation-state, as the primary political unit and the primary unit 
of economic planning, on the one hand, and, on the other, the need to 
integrate the nation-state and national economies into a larger whole that 
would make possible the control, and alleviation, of the excesses of the 
nation-state and of national economies.   
The United Nations rested on giving priority to collective security and 
decisions made collectively by member nations through the UN’s 
institutions.  The UN was intended to provide sufficient international 
security so that the nation-state could continue to function with only 
minimal restrictions on its sovereignty while its sovereignty was limited to 
the extent that the collective interest of the whole inhibited its exercise of 
independence to the point where it seriously infringed on other nation-
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states.  While the UN’s history has been checkered by moments of success 
and by failures, its fundamental premise has only recently come under 
direct attack.  The UN has held out at least the promise of security for small 
states in the face of potentially predatory larger neighbors, and the 
consequences of the failure or even the weakening of the UN for small states 
would be serious indeed. 
The institutions of the “Bretton Woods Compromise” are more to our 
point, however.  At the end of World War II, it was commonly recognized 
that the world consisted of states and nation-states that differed from each 
other, sometimes radically, in ideology, social policy, socioeconomic 
systems, levels of development, national purpose, institutional structures 
and political processes.  Moreover, each state had its own political 
procedures for arriving at policy determinations.  If peace were to be 
preserved (even in the midst of the Cold War) and stability maintained, 
differences had to be mediated rather than overcome, and the Bretton 
Woods institutions were created for that purpose.  To be sure, there was a 
preference for democracy (not surprising after the anti-Fascist war), but it 
was rooted in the idea that diversity of political, social and economic 
arrangements could be tolerated and preserved by the development of 
institutions that encouraged growth and attended to the alleviation of crises 
that might otherwise weaken the stability of the international system.  The 
GATT was intended to provide a procedural framework within which the 
adjustment of the institutions and procedures could take place to account 
for change. 
The Bretton Woods compromise began to fall apart at the beginning of 
the 1980s with the Thatcher government in Great Britain and the Reagan 
administration in the United States.  The idea of mediation between states 
with their own arrangements gave way to the idea of the market as the over-
determining institution to which the nation-state had to acquiesce if it were 
to develop, or even to survive.  The market trumped any and all domestic 
arrangements within individual nation-states.  Moreover, the market was 
assumed to be a self-controlling mechanism.  All this was legitimated by the 
fall of the Soviet Union and the supposed turn of China away from 
“socialism” to “capitalism.”  The WTO, replacing the GATT in 1995, was the 
institutional expression of the new “globalization.”  It is supposed to 
provide a means for negotiating the acquiescence of individual nation-states 
to the world market, but the “conditionalities” which surround any given 
nation-state’s entry into the world market are, both logically and politically, 
only temporary; the inexorable power of the world market will dissolve 
them in due course.  The crucial difference between the Bretton Woods 
institutions and the WTO is contained in the difference between mediation 
and acquiescence.  The first real indication that this inexorable power could 
be challenged came at Seattle in 1999, and the first real challenge occurred at 
Cancun in 2003.   
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Entrance into the WTO holds out the promise, theorists say, of rapid 
local (nation-state) development in return for the surrender of a 
considerable amount of local autonomy.  The ability of the nation state to 
define its own path to improving the conditions of its population, and even 
to define what “improvement” means and in what domains it should take 
place, is surrendered to the global market.  Sovereignty is transformed, and 
diminished, by adhesion to the WTO.   
Here, then, are two parts of the quadrilemma that both in theory and in 
reality are mutually incompatible.  Accession to the WTO severely limits the 
domestic independence of the nation-state in precisely those areas where it 
needs to be effective to survive, namely in the political, social, and economic 
spheres.  As we have seen recently, the WTO, particularly its most powerful 
members, can attempt to place limits even on independence in medical 
(pharmaceutical) and intellectual (TRIPS) areas. 
Good Governance and a Democratic Polity 
  Both globalization (the WTO) and GNH posit “good governance” as a 
sine qua non for development of any kind.  “Good governance” is usually 
interpreted to mean, as we said above, the ability of the stakeholders to hold 
policy formulators and decision makers accountable for their policy 
formulations and decisions.  This raises temporal as well as procedural 
issues.  Temporally, integration into the WTO may take place in such a way 
and at such a time that the stakeholders are either not part of the decision 
for integration or that holding the policy makers to account can take place 
only after the fact, when the decision to enter is irreversible or its 
consequences irredeemable.  In other words, the concept of good 
governance can be nullified by the decision to enter the WTO, which 
supports, theoretically, good governance.  Furthermore, once the nation-
state has acceded to the WTO, large areas of its traditional domains of 
independent action are no longer available to it and are thus removed from 
the reach of good governance.   
Gross National Happiness 
  To the extent that GNH pursues development objectives that are 
different from, or are serious modifications of, the more narrowly 
economistic, definitions of development objectives that the WTO recognizes, 
and to the extent that the WTO, and the World Bank and IMF, which have 
become participants in the new, post-Bretton Woods dispensation, limit the 
ability of the state to pursue happiness socially, politically and economically 
in terms that GNH defines and through institutions and procedures that 
GNH creates, GNH and the WTO appear to be incompatible, at least to 
some extent.  For example, if GNH requires that the state manage the 
economy, whether it be public or private or some mix of the two, to that 
extent arrangements that are predicated on the independence of the 
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economy and on its self-regulation contradict GNH.    GNH posits the 
preservation and development of the national culture as both a purpose and 
an instrument for the preservation of national sovereignty.  Minimally 
controlled international trade, however, which is the immediate goal of the 
WTO, may require allowing the importation of goods that will have a severe 
impact on the national culture.  To that extent GNH and the WTO may be 
mutually contradictory. 
The Quadrilemma 
  Bhutan, like any developing nation, faces an extraordinarily complex 
decision concerning the WTO.  The four components of the decision carry 
some degree of mutual incompatibility.  There is no question that joining 
the WTO may be beneficial, in one way or another, to Bhutan’s economic 
development, at least as development is narrowly defined in economic 
terms.  However, membership has its costs.   The sovereignty of the 
Bhutanese state will be diminished and compromised.  Given the already 
existing degree of economic integration with India, it cannot be determined 
beforehand if the value gained from WTO membership will exceed the 
value already gained from the degree of economic integration between 
Bhutan and India.  As Dani Rodrik puts it, deep economic integration places 
the nation-state in a “golden straightjacket.”  The quality of the gold 
remains in question. 
Membership in the WTO and the globalization of Bhutan’s economy 
may also restrict the degree to which Bhutan can pursue good governance, 
one of the objectives of GNH.  Furthermore, the decision to join the WTO 
and submit to the disciplines of the World Bank, the IMF, etc., cannot be 
made democratically or in consultation with the Bhutanese stakeholders 
because neither the mechanisms nor the educational level necessary for such 
consultation exists at this time.  Unless and until the WTO itself becomes a 
body characterized by good governance, the diminution of good 
governance within Bhutan in exchange for the benefits to be gained from 
accepting the discipline of the WTO and its associated institutions cannot be 
compensated.  A “global federalism,” deeper than, but perhaps patterned 
on, the “Bretton Woods compromise,” is highly unlikely in any foreseeable 
future, given the reluctance of the world’s sole super-power, and a host of 
second tier powers, to surrender a significant degree of sovereignty to world 
bodies. 
The surrender of sovereignty by small states, for example the loss of 
the ability to forbid or even control imports, will inevitably undermine 
national culture as the nation’s economy becomes more and more 
globalized.  The “westernization” or “North Americanization” of Bhutanese 
culture will be propelled forward at a faster rate than might otherwise be 
the case, particularly given the condition that Bhutanese culture itself has to 
be deepened and strengthened through education, the humanities, 
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consciousness of values, etc., to be able even to begin to withstand the 
onslaught of international trade borne-cultural change. 
The pursuit of GNH depends upon the affirmation and reinforcement 
of Bhutan’s ability to exercise self-determination in the positing of long-
range objectives, short- and intermediate-range policy decisions, and the 
development of the institutions and values in which those long-range 
objectives will be embedded and the procedures through which they will be 
realized.  WTO membership weakens and diminishes national self-
determination institutionally, procedurally, and culturally. 
None of this is to suggest that membership in the WTO will not bring 
significant advantages to Bhutan.  Perhaps those advantages will be judged 
to be potentially of such a magnitude and quality that Bhutan should cut 
through the quadrilemma like Alexander the Great cut the Gordion’s knot.  
The magnitude and complexity of the decision is in ratio to Bhutan’s present 
stage of development and the fixed reality of its size and power vis-à-vis the 
WTO itself and its neighbors.  In any event, the fate of the operationalization 
of Gross National Happiness lies at the very center of this decision. 
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